OPINION

TO: Director, Department of Administration

FROM: Attorney General

RE: Organicity of Legislatively Imposed Hiring Freeze and Other Conditions on Executive Management Decisions in P.L. 31-77 (Sept. 20, 2011)

FACTS

Chapter XIV, Part II of Public Law 31-77, signed into law by the Governor on September 20, 2001, reads in pertinent part:

Section 1. Legislative Findings and Intent. I Liheslaturan Guåhan finds that in reviewing the submittal of Bill 145-31 (COR), the Executive Branch’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2012, the sum of Eleven Million Six Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Seven Dollars ($11,654,927) was requested to fill three hundred fifty-six (356) vacancies under the direction of I Maga’låhi Gååhan.

I Liheslatura further finds that the funding level for the Guam Department of Education (GDOE), included with I Maga’låhi’s request, was underfunded by over Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000) below the adjusted authorized levels for Fiscal Year 2011 and trended for organic growth.

I Liheslatura recognizes that funding these vacancies as requested by I Maga’låhi and allowing appropriation levels for GDOE to fall below its current requirements, also as proposed by the Executive Branch, is tantamount to an egregious sacrifice in the quality of education for the students of Guam who already experience the downfall of financial disturbances at their school campuses and in the classrooms.

It is the intent of I Liheslaturan Guåhan, therefore, that vacancies in Fiscal Year 2012 that are funded by the General Fund shall not\(^1\) be included in appropriations in this Act.

\(^1\) Unless otherwise noted, emphases in italics contained in quoted provisions of P.L. 77-31 are in the original.
Section 2. Hiring Freeze. All departments and agencies of the Executive Branch are prohibited from filling vacant positions with appropriations in this Act, except as provided for herein and in Chapter XIV, Part III, Section 3 of this Act. This prohibition applies to appointments of any persons not currently employed by the government of Guam, including permissive reinstatements, limited-term appointments, temporary-authorization appointments, and retired-annuitant appointments beginning October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012.

The Department of Education, the University of Guam, the Guam Community College, the Guam Fire Department, the Guam Police Department, the Department of Corrections, Law Enforcement Divisions of DYA, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Parks & Recreation, the Unified Judiciary, the Office of the Attorney General, the Customs and Quarantine Agency, the Department of Public Health and Social Services, the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse, and the Department of Revenue and Taxation may fill positions vacated due to retirement, termination or resignation at or below the grade-step level of the vacated position. The Department of Public Works is authorized to hire Bus Drivers to fill vacant Bus Driver positions.

Part III, Section 3 provides in its entirety:

Vacancy Pool Cost Account Funded by Special Funds. There is hereby created a Vacancy Pool Cost Account for which all appropriations from specified Special Funds listed in Section 3, Part III of this Chapter to the Vacancy Pool Cost Account in this Act and subsequent Acts for vacant positions of the Executive Branch departments, unless otherwise stated, shall be deposited in to the Vacancy Pool Cost Account. This Cost Account shall only be used to pay salaries of new hires, funded by Special Funds, after October 1, 2011 for positions unfilled at the beginning of FY 2012 for the specified agency.

This Cost Account shall not be subject to I Maga tåhen Guåhan’s transfer authority, but corresponding amounts shall be transferred by the Bureau of Budget and Management Research (BBMR) to an agency or department to be used for payroll upon the filling of an authorized position.

The Cost Account shall be available to pay the salaries of employees who are returning to their government positions from military deployment, who were not in the previous fiscal year staffing pattern, drawing a salary. Certification of the availability of funds for the recruitment GG1s for all vacancies to be filled using the Vacancy Pool Cost Account shall be processed by BBMR.

The Unified Judiciary is of course not a part of the executive branch. See 48 U.S.C. §1421a ("The government of Guam shall consist of three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial...."); see generally, 48 U.S.C. § 1424-1 (establishing the judiciary). Its inclusion here is unexplained.
In his transmittal letter to the Legislature, the Governor noted the following:

**Shortfalls in Critical Service Areas**

**Chapter XIV, Section 2. Hiring Freeze.** The government may not have the ability to fill management level positions critical to departments operations when incumbent vacates through resignation, retirement or other separations. This will negatively impact the ability of departments and agencies to provide mandated services with manpower deficiencies.

The Governor then identified eight specific departments in which shortfalls have already been identified that if the Legislature’s hiring freeze mandate were observed would or could “negatively impact the ability of departments and agencies to provide mandated services with manpower deficiencies,” including the Veterans Affairs Office; Guam Fire Department; Guam Memorial Hospital Authority; Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse; Department of Integrated Services for Individuals with Disabilities; Department of Administration; Guam Regional Transit Authority; and Department of Revenue & Taxation.

The question presented is whether the legislative prohibition on filling vacancies in “[a]ll departments and agencies of the executive branch,” with exceptions for a limited number of departments and agencies whose discretion is further limited to only being permitted to “fill positions vacated due to retirement, termination or resignation at or below the grade-step level of the vacated position,” runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.

**DISCUSSION**

“[U]nder the Organic Act, the government of Guam is comprised of three separate but co-equal branches of government.” In re Request of Gutierrez, 2002 Guam 1 ¶ 32; Hamlet v. Charfauros, 1999 Guam 18 ¶ 9; Taisipic v. Marion, 1996 Guam 9 ¶ 6.

The applicability of the separation of powers doctrine is evident in the language of the Organic Act itself, which provides that “[t]he government of Guam shall consist of three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial....” 48 U.S.C. § 1421a (1992); see also Hamlet, 1999 Guam 18 at ¶ 9 (“By its very language, therefore, the Organic Act requires application of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers to government of Guam functions.”) (citation omitted).

Villagomez-Palisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13 ¶ 14 (editorial brackets in the original).

The issue before us is clearly an Organic Act issue. This is because of the well-established principle in this jurisdiction that the Guam Legislature cannot enact laws which are in derogation of the provisions of the Organic Act.

We underscored this principle in In re Request of Governor Gutierrez, when we stated that the legislature may not enact a law encroaching upon the Governor’s authority and powers which are mandated by the Organic Act.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also recognizes that Guam’s self-government is constrained by the Organic Act and therefore, courts are compelled to invalidate Guam statutes in derogation of the Organic Act. Thus, the Legislature’s powers are broad, but
are constrained by the provisions of Organic Act of Guam, and in turn, this court’s interpretation of such law. The court must declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional if an analysis of the constitutional claim compels such a result.

*Underwood v. Guam Election Com’n*, 2006 Guam 17 ¶ 19-21 (editorial brackets, internal quotation marks and citations omitted; editorial ellipsis supplied). “In this system of checks and balances, the Governor must not be allowed to act in silence and the Legislature must not be allowed to subvert the Executive Branch.” *Pangelinan v. Gutierrez*, 2000 Guam 11 ¶ 31.

The authority of the Guam Legislature is set forth in Guam’s Organic Act. “The legislative power of Guam shall extend to all subjects of legislation of local application not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter and the United States applicable to Guam...” 48 U.S.C. § 1423a (emphasis added). The Governor’s powers, at 48 U.S.C. § 1422, provide in relevant part: “The Governor shall have general supervision and control of all the departments, bureaus, agencies, and other instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government of Guam... He shall appoint, and may remove, all officers and employees of the executive branch of the government of Guam, except as otherwise provided in this or any other Act of Congress, or under the laws of Guam, and shall commission all officers he may be authorized to appoint. He shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of Guam and the laws of the United States applicable in Guam.”

Even absent a finding that one branch has usurped a power exclusively reserved for another branch, a separation of powers violation may be found if “one branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers.”

*In re Request of Governor Gutierrez, Relative to the Organicity and Constitutionality of Public Law 26-35*, 2002 Guam 1 ¶¶ 34, 35 (quoting *Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State*, 802 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); and citing *People of Guam v. Perez*, 1999 Guam 2 at ¶ 17, adopting the framework for analyzing separation of powers challenges in *Nixon v. Administrator of General Services*, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("In determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether the impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.").

“Thus, two separate elements must be evaluated: (1) whether the statutory provision prevents the accomplishment of constitutional functions and (2) if so, whether the disruptive impact is justified by any overriding constitutional need.” *People of Guam v. Perez*, 1999 Guam 2 at ¶ 17. “[I]f the statutory provision in question does not prevent the Governor from accomplishing his constitutional functions, we need not consider part two of the test and no separation of powers concern exists." *In re Request of Governor Felix P. Camacho Relative to the Interpretation and Application of Sections 6 and 9 of the Organic Act of Guam*, 2004 Guam 10 ¶ 52.

The question presented here is whether the hiring freeze contained in Chapter XIV, Part II of Public Law 31-77 may, as suggested in the Governor’s transmittal letter, “negatively impact the ability of departments and agencies to provide mandated services with manpower deficiencies,” to such a degree that the mandate if observed would or could (1) prevent the accomplishment of the Governor’s constitutional functions and (2) if so, whether the disruptive impact is justified by any overriding constitutional need. *Perez*, 1999 Guam 2 at ¶ 17.
In *Bordallo v. Baldwin*, 624 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with a challenge to legislation intended to circumscribe the Governor’s power of appointment with respect to the board of trustees of the Guam Memorial Hospital. The court rejected the Legislature’s argument that the phrase in Guam’s Organic Act “except as otherwise provided in this chapter or the laws of Guam” and the inclusion of the phrase “subject to the laws of Guam” was intended to authorize the Legislature to limit the Governor’s powers of appointment.

Defendants argue that the Governor’s general appointive power as set forth in Section 1422c(a), was clearly intended to be subject to legislative action, otherwise Congress would not have included the phrase “except as otherwise provided in this chapter or the laws of Guam”, and that his specific responsibility with respect to hospitals is restricted by the inclusion in Section 1421g(a) of the phrase “subject to the laws of Guam”. But they failed to recognize that legislative power is limited by Section 1423a to subjects “not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter”.

*Bordallo*, 624 F.2d at 934-35. Even though the Legislature’s power is plenary, it is constrained “by Section 1423a to subjects ‘not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter,’” *id.*, namely, that the Legislature’s power is always subject to the doctrine of separation of powers expressed in § 1421a.

In *Santos v. Calvo*, 1982 WL 30790 (D.Guam A.D. 1982), the appellate division of the district court of Guam was presented with the question whether the Governor was required to seek legislative approval and a special appropriation before executing a settlement agreement which provided for the payment of severance pay to the Attorney General. The superior court had previously found that the agreement violated a provision of Guam law which provides: “No officer or employee of the government of Guam including the Governor of Guam, shall: Engage the government of Guam in any contract or other obligation, for the payment of money for any purpose, in advance of an appropriation made for such purpose.” The court noted the general rule that whereas the Legislature has plenary power over appropriations, and may attach conditions to the expenditure of appropriated funds, once those funds are appropriated, the legislature’s involvement ends. The court quoted the following from the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in *State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment*, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Neb.1970) with approval:

“The Legislature has plenary or absolute power over appropriations. It may make them upon such conditions and with such restrictions as it pleases within constitutional limits. There is one thing, however, which it cannot do, ... [i]t cannot administer the appropriation once it has been made. When the appropriation is made, its work is complete and the executive authority takes over to administer the appropriation to accomplish its purpose, subject to the limitations imposed.”

*Santos*, *5*. “Were this action not permitted by the Governor the Legislature could restrict the executive branch in the operation of its various functions thereby exercising an executive prerogative in direct conflict with the precept of our Constitution which prohibits one branch of government from encroaching upon or performing the duties of another.” *Id.* *6* (quoting *State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship*, 157 W.Va. 100, 207 S.E.2d 421, 435 (W.Va.1973)).

In *In re Request of Governor Gutierrez, Relative to the Organicity and Constitutionality of Public Law 26-35*, 2002 Guam 1, the Guam Supreme Court discussed the respective powers and responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches.
The Legislature’s plenary power of appropriation includes the power to impose “conditions upon the expenditure of appropriated funds.” *Santos*, 1982 WL 30790, at *7; *Schneider*, 547 P.2d at 799 (“[T]he appropriation of money and the setting of limitations on expenditures by state executive agencies constitutes an exercise of legislative power.”). One such condition to an appropriation is the designation of positions within the government. *Communications Workers*, 617 A.2d at 235 (The legislature may “appropriate and dictate, if it desires, the services and positions designated for such appropriation.”) (citation omitted). The legislature may also designate salaries for various positions. *Opinion of the Justices*, 266 A.2d at 826 (“[I]n the absence of express legislative authority the Governor and [executive committee] ... may not fix salaries even of personnel which the Governor is empowered to appoint.”); *State ex rel. Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment*, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (1970) (“It is within the power of the Legislature to fix the amount it will appropriate for personal services in any state department or agency.”).

However, the Legislature may not set limitations or conditions which “purport to reserve to the legislature powers of close supervision that are essentially executive in character.” See *Anderson*, 579 P.2d at 624 (Colo.1978). “Staffing decisions are at the core of the Governor’s day-to-day administration of government.” *Communications Workers*, 617 A.2d at 234. Accordingly, the legislature may not set conditions to an appropriation which impinge on the executive’s power to “allocate staff and resources” for the proper fulfillment of its duty to execute the laws. See *Anderson*, 579 P.2d at 623-24.

*Id.*, 2002 Guam I ¶¶ 44, 45 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court turned next to the question whether the Legislature’s attempt to dictate the terms of a lease for the rental of office space for the Attorney General’s Office was inorganic. The Court said it was.

The provisions of Budget Bill that dictate terms of the lease are more problematic. In *Chaffin v. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n*, 296 Ark. 431, 757 S.W.2d 950 (1988), the court was presented with a constitutional challenge to an appropriations bill. Specifically, the challenged legislation prohibited the Fish and Game Commission from entering into contracts for professional and consultant services which either extend more than 20 working days, or exceed $5,000.00, without first seeking the advice of the legislature. *Chaffin*, 757 S.W.2d at 956. After receiving a contract, a committee of the Legislative Council reviews the contract and stamps it favorable or unfavorable. *Id.* Although the stamp of approval or disapproval was not binding on the agency, the court found that “the ‘advice’ offered by the [legislative] committee to an agency is tantamount to a legislative order on how to execute a contract.” *Id.* The court held the requirement that the agency submit its contracts for legislative advice to be in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and therefore unconstitutional. *Id.*

The instant case is analogous to *Chaffin*, and supports a finding of a more egregious violation of the separation of powers doctrine. In the instant case, the Legislature has not merely reserved for itself the power to give “advice” on the specifics of the contract; rather, the Legislature has dictated the exact terms of the contract. As *Chaffin* instructs, it is the executive’s function to determine how to execute a contract. See *id.* at 956-57. The execution of a contract necessarily includes determining the terms
By determining the terms of the lease, the Legislature has engaged in a clear executive function.

Id., 2002 Guam 1 ¶¶ 53, 54 (footnote omitted; editorial brackets in original). As the case illustrates, it is one thing for the legislature to set dollar limits on the amounts available in the first instance by way of conditional appropriations. It is a different matter for the legislature to dictate exact terms of a contract or be involved in the process of negotiation and execution of a lease after funds have been appropriated.

The Court recognized that conditional appropriations, i.e., appropriations that are released upon the satisfaction of predefined conditions precedent or that lapse if not used, do not violate the separation of powers doctrine per se. Writing separately with respect to another provision of the challenged law, Justice pro tempore Richard H. Benson noted, “The legislature’s power of appropriation includes the power to impose a condition that funds lapse if not used. The limitation to this power is that the condition imposed must not create such an interference with another branch’s functions so as to prevent that other branch from fulfilling its constitutionally prescribed duties.” Id., 2002 Guam 1 ¶ 74 (Benson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Decisions from Georgia and New York involving budget controversies between legislative bodies and coordinate branches of state and local government – executive and judicial – have held that while the legislative branch may be authorized to reduce funding in an executive or judicial budget, it may not encroach on executive or administrative discretion in the manner in which hiring, firing, and supervising decisions are made.

The Supreme Court of Georgia has held, “a county commission does not, by itself, have the authority to disapprove expenditures for a county officer once that officer’s budget has been approved by the commission.” Griffies v. Coveta County, 272 Ga. 506, 508, 530 S.E.2d 718, 720 (Ga. 2000). See also, Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203, 415 S.E.2d 906, 907-08 (Ga. 1992) (“although the county commission has the power and the duty to issue a budget, the county commission may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties”). The courts of that state appear to require development of a trial record. See, Board of Com’rs of Dougherty County v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176, 177, 178, 598 S.E.2d 437, 439-40 (Ga. 2004) (“Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court for determination of the question apropos of the case at this juncture: Did the Board of Commissioners adopt a budget for the Sheriff’s department that did not reasonably and adequately provide for the personnel and equipment necessary to enable the Sheriff to perform his duties of enforcing the law and preserving the peace, and thereby abuse its discretion?”) (citations omitted); Boswell v. Bramlett, 274 Ga. 50, 52, 549 S.E.2d 100, 102-03 (Ga. 2001) (“We note, however, that the county commission has the authority to review and approve the proposed budget for Boswell’s office, and that its action in making the appropriations for Boswell’s office is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the commission does not have the authority to dictate to Boswell how she will spend the budget that has been approved for her office. In the present case, because the record shows that there was money in Boswell’s budget, as approved by the commission, to pay for the salary increases in question, we conclude that Boswell acted properly in granting those pay increases.”) (footnotes omitted).

In New York, in In re Mohr v Greenan, 10 Misc.3d 610, 803 N.Y.S.2d 876 (2005), the trial court held that a resolution approving a hiring freeze adopted by the Erie County Legislature was unenforceable as applied to the County Board of Elections. “The effect of the hiring freeze resolution, if applied to the Board of Elections, would be inconsistent with and undermine petitioners’ constitutional and statutory authority.” Id., 10 Misc.3d 616, 803 N.Y.S.2d 876 (citations omitted), aff’d, 37 A.D.3d 1094, 828
N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. 2007); see also, In Graziano v. County of Albany, 2003 WL 21497332 * 3 (N.Y. Sup. 2003) (legislative resolution by Albany County that established a hiring freeze for non-essential positions “constituted an unconstitutional infringement on [election] board’s unfettered right to staff as it deemed appropriate within confines of budget”), agreeing with the trial court decision but reversing on other grounds, 309 A.D.2d 1062, 76 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2003).

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has engaged in the same kind of separation of powers analysis as applied to the funding of employees within the judicial branch.

However, that power encroached on the Judiciary’s authority to hire, fire, and supervise its employees when the Salary Board directed the Judiciary to eliminate five trial court employee positions. As a co-equal and independent branch of government, the Judiciary has the right to decide how to square its operating needs within the budget allocated to it. Presumably, the Judiciary had options, other than eliminating five employee positions, which would have allowed it to operate within a reduced budget.19

Accordingly, the Judiciary’s constitutional right to hire, fire, and supervise its employees was violated when [the] Salary Board eliminated the five trial court employee positions. Rather than charging the Salary Board with implementing the budget reductions, the constitution and separation of powers doctrine mandate that the County present the Judiciary with the reduced budget and allow the Judiciary to determine how to operate within it. Stated another way, once the County appropriates funds to the Judiciary, it is the Judiciary’s constitutional duty to allocate the funds to administer justice. This procedure preserves the County’s constitutional budget-making prerogative, while also maintaining the Judiciary’s independence, thereby allowing it to exercise its constitutional right to hire, fire, and supervise its employees. The Judiciary would then have had the opportunity, as an alternative to eliminating the five employee positions, to determine other ways to reduce costs in order to operate within the budget.

19For example, the Judiciary could have decreased funding for technology as well as various other expenses and services. We do not suggest that the Judiciary would not have had to engage in its own economic layoffs, subject to its collective bargaining obligations, if doing so would have been necessary to operate within its budget. The import of this analysis is that decisions regarding the hiring, firing, and supervising of trial court employees are the Judiciary’s, not the County’s or the Salary Board’s, to make.


4 Where the line is drawn is not always clear. At a minimum, the coordinate branches of government have a duty to cooperate with one another when there are unanticipated budget shortfalls. Compare Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So.2d 890, 895 (Ala. 1993) (“In light of general State and Federal constitutional requirements and the specific provisions of Ala. Const., Amend. 328, our interpretation means that [statutorily authorized proration of budget appropriations by the executive branch] cannot constitutionally apply to reduce appropriations to the Judicial Branch below that level necessary for the Judicial Branch to perform the duties required of it under Federal and State constitutional law. This rationale is equally applicable to the other separate, independent, and co-equal branches of government. That is, proration could not apply to reduce funding for either the Legislative Branch or the Executive Branch to such a level that it is
Appropriations once made are, of course, always subject to the continued availability of funds. The question is: Who has final authority to decide how those funds are to be managed after they have been appropriated, assuming funds do remain in the event of a vacancy due to retirement, termination or resignation?

Under the Organic Act, the Governor is given the responsibility and authority to supervise and control departments, agencies and other instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government. This includes ensuring, within budgetary limits, that each executive branch department and agency has sufficient manpower with the skills necessary to perform the functions for which each agency and department was created. An agency or a division of an agency may have a position which requires certain skills that are important to fulfilling the agency’s mission, such as a need for a particular type of engineer. If the person currently occupying the position resigns, the agency will need to find a replacement or be left without an employee who is key to the work of the agency. Additionally, if an agency has two vacancies, its Director may decide that it is best for the agency to use its budget to hire only one employee at a higher skill level, thereby requiring a higher grade and/or step for the new employee. These are just two examples of executive decision making in government agencies related to hiring government employees. Such decisions fall within the Governor’s Organic Act authority to supervise and control agencies and to appoint and remove all officers and employees of the executive branches of the government. Hence, the Governor has the authority to fill classified positions, through the merit system, in a manner which he feels is in the best interest of a particular agency.

CONCLUSION

In exercising its Organic Act authority, the Legislature appropriates funds to each executive department and agency. But, when the Legislature mandates how the appropriated funds are to be spent in regard to filling or not filling positions and at what grade and step level positions will be filled, it encroaches upon the Governor’s administrative authority to supervise and control the executive branch of the government.

Chapter XIV, Part II, Section 2 of Public Law 31-77 prohibits the filling of vacancies in some executive departments and agencies and allows the filling of vacancies in other departments and agencies but only at or below the grade and step level of the vacated position (the “hiring freeze provisions”). The executive branch must operate within its legislative appropriations. However, these hiring freeze provisions of Public Law 31-77 do not merely appropriate funds. The provisions impermissibly encroach upon the executive decision making process of evaluating whether or not to replace an employee and determining
what employee skill level best suits the needs of an agency. Consequently, the hiring freeze provisions of Public Law 31-77 unconstitutionally intrude upon the Governor’s Organic Act authority to supervise and control the departments, agencies and other instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government. Therefore, Chapter XIV, Part II, Section 2 of Public Law 31-77 violates the doctrine of separation of powers and is inorganic.²

² Chapter XIV, Part III, Section 3 of Public Law 31-77 – the vacancy pool cost account provisions – are dependent upon the enforcement of Chapter XIV, Part II, Section 2 of Public Law 31-77 – the hiring freeze provisions. Consequently, the vacancy pool account provisions of the Public Law 31-77 also succumb to the doctrine of separation of powers.